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ABSTRACT OF THESIS  
THE IMPACT OF FOOD RECALL ON THIRD PARTY CERTIFICATION 
ADOPTION 
Food safety problems have gained national attention, and food recall is one of 
the most important indications of this concern. Third-party certifications have become 
a popular way to improve the safety and quality of products for consumers. 
Publications related to third-party certification usually focus on the motives and 
benefits of a particular certification. However, to date, no existing research 
investigates the effects of food recalls on certification adoption.  
 This study uses probit models with a binary endogenous explanatory variable 
to examine the relationship between food recalls and third-party certification, based 
on recalls occurring between January 1, 2015 and February 18, 2016. Marginal effects 
are used to interpret the impact of recalls and companies’ annual net sales on third-
party certification adoption. Results reveal that past recalls significantly effect a 
firm’s likelihood of certification adoption. 
KEYWORDS: Food recall, Third-party certifications, Probit model, Binary 
endogenous explanatory, Marginal effect. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 In the last few decades, food safety concerns have grown significantly around 
the world due to the increasing incidence of food-related safety issues. The risk of 
foodborne illness is the most notable of these issues and, with nearly a quarter of the 
U.S. population currently highly at risk of contracting such an illness (Oliver et al., 
2005), numerous meat recalls occur due to possible foodborne illnesses each year. 
From 2000 to 2007, in the United States alone, it is estimated that about 47.8 million 
people per year become ill as a direct result of 31 known foodborne illness (FoodNet 
data). To ensure food safety and prevent illnesses and deaths related to foodborne 
pathogens, facilities adopt various methods to more efficiently and safely 
manufacture, process, pack, and store food. One such method is the adoption of third-
party certification, which can help a company develop a detailed scheme to identify 
any problems in the way they make, pack, or store their products that could be 
hazardous to consumers.  
 In recent years, major food safety events involving ground beef, ground 
turkey, egg, peanut butter, and spinach have resulted in thousands of illnesses, 
widespread media attention and hundreds of product recalls. Food recalls, as strong 
indicators of food safety problems, occur regularly for many reasons. The most 
dangerous and widely noted is microbiologic contamination, which can cause 
foodborne illnesses. An standard example of a food recall occured on July 3, 2015; 
according to the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection 
Service. Denver’s Lombardi Brothers Meats issued a recall of approximately 26,975 
pounds of tenderized steak and ground beef products. These products may have been 
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contaminated with E. coli O157:H7, and they had ben distributed to local hotels, 
restaurants and institutional customers throughout the southern and western United 
States. The company’s sampling program received a positive E. coli test result on 
June 30 from a sample collected from the same source as the product already sold to 
the public. Due to the quick response, FSIS and the company received no reports of 
illnesses related to the consumption of these products. As this example shows, food 
recall is an important tool in responding to contamination incidents. However, when a 
company issues a recall, their reputation as well as consumer loyalty and intention to 
purchase is threatened. Individuals’ willingness to pay decreases as a result of these 
foodborne illnesses. How companies can regain consumer confidence after incidents 
of food recall then becomes an important question. 
 As companies try to maintain their reputations for producing safe products, an 
important way for firms and plants to ensure controlled food safety processes is by 
obtaining third-party certification (TPC). TPC, as a governance mechanism, is 
becoming a popular component of the global agro-food system and is being accepted 
by larger consumers and retailers. Companies benefit by implementing TPC as a tool 
to monitor and enforce standards for food quality and safety (Hatanaka et al., 2008). 
Consumers’ willingness to pay higher prices for certified products reflects their 
concern about food safety issues (Rozan et al., 2004). Certification standards are also 
implemented in order to regain consumer trust in product safety.  
 Governments and administrative offices devise and implement national-level 
food legislation and technical requirements for food processing, handling, and 
production processes. These laws and requirements provide incentives for firms to 
adopt appropriate production processes and methods. In addition to incentives driven 
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by food and liability law, retailers, such as the SQF certification and Primus GFS, are 
also a major source for other motives that encourage firms to go beyond the basic 
adoption of approved practices meeting government requirements towards the 
adoption of third-party certification to meet market demand. These motives can be 
classified as either internal or external incentives for third-party certification adoption. 
Internal incentives are synonymous with internal forces that push the organization to 
seek TPC; they can be associated either with managerial performance (i.e. improving 
communication between the organization’s employees) or with operational 
performance (i.e. improving the organization’s quality system), both of which are 
directly affected by adoption. External incentives are largely related to motives 
associated with a company’s external environment, such as customers, competitors, 
suppliers, and the government. The term “external environment” refers to elements 
that are outside an organization but still have the potential to affect all or part of it 
(Zaramdini, 2007). Although some research has looked at whether TPC is necessary 
and what motivates a company to apply for a particular certification, little is known, 
however, about the relationship between a company issuing a food recall and TPC 
adoption. This paper discusses how food recalls impact TPC, as well as which recall 
factor is most influential on TPC adoption. 
 Additionally, this paper contributes to the existing literature from several 
perspectives. Firstly, we have constructed a comprehensive dataset for recall 
information in the U.S. for the period of January 1, 2015 to February 18, 2016; this 
dataset provides an overview of all recall-related information occurring within this 
period. Secondly, we searched through each company’s TPC adoption history. Six 
global third-party food safety certifications considered, all of which are recognized 
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and popular around the world. Thirdly, we tested the effects of recall on TPC 
adoption, the results of which strongly support the real effects of food recall activities 
on TPC adoption. Lastly, we present an initial exploration of food recall as a TPC 
motivator; these findings may thus provide useful insights on the subject.  
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CHAPTER 2 BACKGROUND   
 Although the United States enjoys one of the world’s safest food and water 
supplies, it still sees 76 million cases of foodborne illness each year, leading to 
billions of dollars in damages, unnecessary suffering, and nearly 5,000 deaths. The 
salmonella outbreak in 2008, caused by peanut butter manufactured by the Peanut 
Corporation of America, killed nine people and sickened 714 others across 46 states. 
In another example, the recall of over a half billion fresh eggs from Wright County 
Egg and Hillandale Farms resulted in heightened food safety problems and media 
coverage of food recalls that drew direct public attention. Foodborne illnesses, which 
are caused by 15 major pathogens, cost 1.9 billion dollars in 2013 alone (ERS). For 
meat and poultry recalls, the weight recalled increased from 6 million pounds in 1988 
to 21 million pounds in 2015. Figure 2.1 shows the change in the number of recalls 
from 1994 to 2015. 
Figure 2.1 Numbers of Meat and Poultry Recalls from 1994 to 2015 
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 Since early this century, third-party certification has played a significant role 
in the global food-safety system. More companies have begun to select TPC, which is 
increasingly viewed as a tool for gaining a competitive advantage. Certifications 
chosen for study in this paper are leading and popular standards around the world; the 
aim of these certifications is to guarantee the standardization of quality, safety, and 
operational criteria, to ensure that manufacturers fulfill their legal obligations, and to 
provide protection for consumers. By jointly discussing recalls from within the last 
year and six TPC standards, this paper focuses on the implications of food recalls on 
TPC adoption. 
2.1 Background information: Food Recall Statistics 
 Food recalls are currently quite common. They are used as a means for 
improving food safety by removing faulty products from markets. If foods enter the 
market with the potential to cause serious adverse health effects, companies and 
government regulators will recall these products. There have been over 600 recalls in 
the U.S. and Canada in the past 12 months. Of these, 150 involved meat, poultry, egg, 
and mixed1 products and were regulated by the Food Safety and Inspection Service 
(FSIS), a branch of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). As shown 
in Figure 2.2, poultry meat was recalled in the largest quantity in 2011. One reason 
for this difference was food producer and marketer Cargill issued a recall of 36 
million pounds of ground turkey because it may have been contaminated with a drug-
                                                 
1 "Mixed" refers to cases in which more than one type of meat or poultry species is included. 
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resistant strain of salmonella. And in 2014, beef was recalled far more than poultry or 
mixed meat products for a California-based Rancho Feeding Corporation was solely 
responsible for a recall of approximately 8,742,700 pounds of beef product: the 
company had processed diseased and unsound animals and had done so without the 
benefit or full benefit of a federal inspection. Products had then been shipped to 
distribution centers and retail establishments in California, Florida, Illinois, Oregon, 
Texas, and Washington. Both of these two cases were a Class I food recall case. 
Figure 2.2 Recalled Weights by Species from 2011 to 2015 
(Units: in 100,000 Pounds) 
 
Source: FSIS, USDA, 2011-2015  
 
 Depending on the degree of the health hazard posed, food recalls can be 
organized into three different classes, defined by the USDA as follows: 
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Class II –involving a potential health hazard situation in which there is 
a remote probability of adverse health consequences from eating the food; and 
Class III –involving a situation in which eating the food will not cause adverse health 
consequences.  
 As we can see from the above the definition, a Class I recall refers to 
dangerous or defective products that could predictably cause serious health problems 
or even death. However, as shown in Figure 2.3, the majority of recall cases from 
2012 to 2015 were Class I, a rate which is still gradually increasing each year. For this 
reason, I have chosen to focus on Class I cases in this paper. 
Figure 2.3 Recalled Cases by Class from 2011 to 2015   
 
Source: FSIS, USDA, 2011-2015  
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summary, recalls can be caused by STEC2, Listeria monocytogenes, Salmonella, 
undeclared allergens, extraneous materials, processing defects, undeclared substances, 
and other reasons. As shown in Figure 2.4, the presence of an undeclared allergen was 
always the most common recall reason from 2011 to 2015. In addition to foodborne 
illnesses, allergens are another significant threat to human health, not only for the 15 
million Americans who suffer from food allergies but also for the food manufacturers 
that produce the foods we eat (Maberry, 2016).  
 Certainly, the reasons behind each individual recall are more complicated than 
what is reflected in the annual summary above. For ease of demonstration in this 
study, however, recall reasons are classified into two main groups. Reason 1 is for 
products that are misbranded and/or include undeclared allergens, are produced 
without the benefit of federal inspection and/or do not have a federal mark of 
inspection or were not presented at the U.S. point of entry for inspection. Reason 2 
designates products that may be contaminated with extraneous materials or 
adulterated with a pathogen such as E. coli, Listeria monocytogenes or Salmonella. In 
2015, most recalls were the result of operational mistakes, such as incorrect labeling 
or the presence of an undeclared ingredient, classed as Reason 1. Although cases with 
biological causes included in Reason 2, such as the detection of Listeria, Salmonella, 
and E. coli, appear in weak proportion compared to the overall number of cases, as 
shown in Table 2.1, they can still cause incidents of foodborne illness. In this paper, I 
                                                 
2  "STEC" includes recalls due to Shiga toxin-producing E. coli (STEC). STEC organisms include E. 
coli O157:H7, E. coli O26, E. coli O45, E. coliO103, E. coli O111, E. coli O121, and E. coli O145. 
10 
 
stress the importance of research on how TPC is impacted by foodborne illness 
recalls, those falling into Reason group 2. 
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Figure 2.4 Number of Recalls by Reason from 2011 to 2015 
 
Source: FSIS, USDA, 2011-2015   
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Table 2.1 Reason Groups in Study Period 
Reason Group Frequency Percent 
Reason 1 219 90.87% 
Reason 2 22 9.13% 
2.2 Background information: Third-Party Certification  
 With an increase in the number of food recalls resulting from the appearance 
of many foodborne diseases, such as mad cow disease, foot-and-mouth disease, and 
microbial contamination of fresh produce, consumer confidence in food safety has 
declined greatly. There are more than 200 known diseases transmitted through food 
by a variety of agents that include bacteria, fungi, viruses, and parasites. Consumers’ 
growing concerns regarding the quality and traceability of products and processes call 
for fundamentally new ways of developing, producing and marketing products, 
thereby also driving the use of TPC. 
 Traditionally, the monitoring of food safety and quality standards was the 
responsibility of government agencies. To solve food safety problems, U.S. federal 
agencies, such as the Department of Agriculture and the Food and Drug 
Administration, developed standards and conducted inspections to ensure food safety 
and other production conditions. Results of this approach, however, have been far 
from ideal. Simultaneous demands on the food retail industry and the improvement of 
private retailer standards have shifted the responsibility for this task to third-party 
certification (Hatanaka et al., 2005). 
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 As a result, third-party certifications (TPC) are increasingly viewed as tools 
for gaining a competitive advantage. The growing number of companies pursuing 
TPC reflects a broader shift from public to private governance. Certifications provide 
market signals concerning food quality claims. Successful third-party certifications 
assure buyers of food quality and reduce the potential for market failure that might 
otherwise occur when information about food quality is uncertain and asymmetrically 
distributed.  
 There has been an increasing number of standards devoted to the promotion of 
food safety. From the ensemble of food safety certifications, the following six third-
party certifications were chosen to be focused on in this paper: the British Retail 
Consortium’s Global Food Safety Standard (BRC); the Safe Quality Food 
certification (SQF); Primus GFS; Food Safety System Certification 22000 (FSSC 
22000); Global Good Agricultural Practice (G.A.P.); and the International 
Organization of Standardization (ISO) 22000 certification. All are leading and 
globally-recognized food safety certifications. Companies possessing these 
certifications are seen as presenting a competitive advantage. The six TPCs are 
introduced below: 
 1. The BRC Standard was originally developed by a trade agency in the UK. It 
is now a leading safety and quality certification program and a basic requirement for 
leading retailers, used by over 23,000 certificated suppliers in 123 countries and even 
adopted by suppliers not selling into the UK mark, sites in the United States alone. 
 2. The SQF certification, established by the SQF Institute (SQFI), presents 
another third-party entity. Each SQF standard can be achieved at three different levels 
– Level 2 is approved by the Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI, an influential non-
14 
 
profit organization that benchmarks food safety standards) – which link primary 
production certification to food manufacturing, distribution and agent/broker 
management certification. It is recognized by retailers and foodservice providers 
around the world and has 5,301 sites in the United States. Administered by the Food 
Marketing Institute (FMI), SQF is now the only scheme to integrate a quality 
component as well as food safety.  
 3. Primus GFS is a Global Food Safety Initiative and globally-recognized 
private scheme that establishes food safety requirements for the certification of 
agricultural produce designated for human consumption in their fresh or minimally-
processed state. This standard defines three fundamental areas that must be 
considered by a company in the agricultural sector when producing or manufacturing 
their products: a Food Safety Management System, Good Agricultural and/or 
Manufacturing Practices (one or both), and the HACCP System. There are currently 
five certification bodies and one provisionally approved certification body in the 
United States, four of which are located in California. 
 4. The FSSC 22000 Food Safety System Certification provides a framework 
for effectively managing an organization's food safety responsibilities. It is also fully 
recognized by the Global Food Safety Initiative and is based on existing ISO 
Standards. It demonstrates that a company has a robust Food Safety Management 
System in place that meets the requirements of consumers. Already, more than ten 
thousand organizations in over 140 countries have achieved FSSC 22000 certification. 
There are currently more than one hundred licensed certification bodies and over 
1,500 auditors worldwide, with 12,043 companies in the United States holding valid 
certificates from FSSC22000. 
15 
 
 5. Global G.A.P. is the world's leading farm assurance program, translating 
consumer requirements into Good Agricultural Practices. Through a growing number 
of producers and retailers from around the world, the European organization has 
gained global significance and is currently adopted by 160,000 producers under 
certification in 124 countries. It began in 1997 as EUREPGAP, an initiative by 
retailers belonging to the Euro-Retailer Produce Working Group, which was started 
when British retailers working with supermarkets in continental Europe became 
aware of consumers’ growing concerns regarding food safety and traceability, 
environmental sustainability, worker health and safety, and animal welfare. It now has 
eight approved certification bodies in the United States. 
 6. ISO 22000 certification is an international standard that defines the 
requirements of a food safety management system for food safety and hygiene 
covering all organizations in the food chain and developed by the International 
Organization for Standardization. This standard was created from the very successful 
quality management system standard ISO 9001, which is used worldwide by over 
700,000 companies. In response to the need for an international standard for the food 
industry, ISO developed a Food Safety Management System, which encourages the 
harmonization of the many existing national and private standards and elaborates on 
the management systems approach of ISO 9001. Based on a changing focus to food 
safety management and an incorporation of PRP and HACCP principles, the ISO 
22000 currenly counts 92 registered companies in the United States. 
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CHAPTER 3 LITERATURE REVIEW  
3.1 History and Development of TPCs 
 As an important method for of market governance, independent third-party 
certifications have developed extremely rapidly in recent years and have made a 
significant contribution towards the improvement of food safety in many fields. 
Acting on a particular set of standards and compliance methods, third-party 
certifications are provided by private or public organizations responsible for 
accessing, evaluating, and certifying safety and quality claims (Deaton, 2004). 
Historically, government agencies, such as the USDA in the United States, were 
responsible for establishing food safety standards. However, private safety standards 
and certification programs are responding to higher consumer requirements, needs for 
safety controls throughout the vertical chain of distribution. Thus these 
responsibilities are now increasingly being shifted to third-party certification bodies, 
which promote the emergence and development of third-party certification as a 
regulatory mechanism in the global agro-food system (Tanner 2000), especially as 
global food trade expands dramatically and provides consumers with access to a 
wider variety of foods all year long.  
Worldwide adoption of TPCs results from collaborations between the world’s 
leading food companies, from retailers and manufacturers to food service sector 
agents and service providers active in the food supply chain. Since food safety is of 
major importance in international trade, cooperation and coordination in the 
development and implementation of TPC throughout the supply chain has been 
marked by a new sense of urgency and focus. The primary goals of TPCs are to 
17 
 
provide consistency and cost efficiency, reduce duplication, increase confidence and 
ensure that the global supply chain is safe for consumers.  
3.2 Structure and Characteristics of TPCs 
 Most certification systems employ very similar structures (see Figure 3.1). A 
certification body is monitored by the system owner and accredited by an 
accreditation body to ensure its ability to provide supplier certification. A certified 
supplier offers customers a qualified product or service which complies with the 
system owners’ standards. 
Figure 3.1 Basic Structure of Certification System 
 
Source: Jahn et al., 2005 
 As can be seen in Figure 3.1, certification bodies are independent from other 
participants in the supply chain as well as from the scheme owner. This structure 
distinguishes TPCs from other product safety and quality certification mechanisms 
(Zuckerman 1996; Tanner 2000; Golan et al. 2001) and, as certification body 
managers and scheme owners retain independence from each other, the food industry 
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can be confident that impartiality is maintained during any audit and between 
certification bodies. Certification bodies can then be viewed as objective arbitrators of 
product safety and quality (Fagan 2003). In other words, the ‘independence’ of 
certification bodies is the basis of TPCs’ legality and effectiveness. Besides 
independence, most TPCs are similar to one another in many ways. Their main 
purpose is to protect consumer health with integrated food safety management, 
fulfilled through specifying the basic requirements acceptable for food safety and 
third-party audits. At the same time, the main differences between food safety 
standards are that they are owned by different organizations in different regions and 
that they deal with different stages of production in the value chain (i.e., farming 
versus manufacturing).  
3.3 Certification Process 
 The certification process for BRC, Primus GFS, Global G.A.P. and SQF are 
similar, often consisting of five steps in a one-year period, as shown in Figure 3.2 and 
described below.  
Step A – According to the firm’s size and nature, the certification body presents the 
manufacturers with a proposal. When the proposal is accepted, the audit process can 
proceed.  
Step B – There is often an optional ‘pre-audit’ stage before the formal audit, which is 
useful in identifying any shortcomings in management systems or in the plant’s 
facilities.  
Step C - The formal audit is an onsite audit. All site areas are assessed to determine 
compliance with each clause of the standard. Concerns or observed non-conformities 
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will be issued in this two-week stage as a pre-report and, at the end of the audit, 
organizations will receive a corrective action report identifying final observed non-
conformities. The certifying entity provides the organization with another two weeks 
to respond to the corrective action report. These non-conformities must be rectified 
and documented with evidence or through an on-site visit. Once the non-conformities 
have been corrected and the auditor has accepted the evidence, an independent 
technical review of the audit is conducted by an authorized certification manager, who 
approves the issuance of a certificate.  
Step D – Most certifications are only valid for one year. Thus, a full recertification 
audit is scheduled for every twelve-months. The audit is a full re-audit conducted in 
the same way as the initial audit, where the implementation of the action plan is also 
reviewed. Earlier non-conformity records are checked. 
 FSSC 22000 & ISO 22000 certifications are often valid for three years since 
surveillance visits are scheduled twice a year and five times in two years. During the 
visits, auditors review the implementation of the action plan, addressing past non-
conformities and examining whether certain mandatory and other selected parts of the 
system are in line with a provided audit plan.  
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Figure 3.2 The Basic Certification Process 
Source: www.SGS.com 
3.4 Motives for and Benefits of TPCs 
 Meeting third-party certifications often entails significant expenses imposed 
on producers, which can pose a significant economic burden for smallholders. Why 
do companies and farms keep seeking third-party food safety certification? Very little 
theoretical research exists which focuses on the motives behind seeking third-party 
certification, and none has focused on the impact of recalls on certification. From an 
empirical perspective as well, no research has explored the relationship between third-
party certification and food recalls. 
 Since the market for agro-food products is becoming increasingly competitive, 
TPC can help suppliers remain in the marketplace, and even expand their market 
share, by allowing them to demonstrate to their customers that they have met 
necessary standards. One of the defining purposes of TPC, particularly as it relates to 
STEP A: 
Agree to 
Contract
STEP 
B: 
Optiona
l Pre-
Audit
STEP C: 
Onsite 
Certification 
Audit
Close out all 
non 
conformities
(if any)
Issue 
Certificate
after 
successful 
audit
STEP D: 
Recertification
21 
 
food safety, is an increasing focus on the processes by which food is produced 
(Henson, Spencer, & Humphrey, 2009), extending into how food is produced, 
transported or processed. Through the adoption of TPCs, food firms are able to make 
better management decisions, thereby improving productivity, efficiency, and product 
and service quality, reducing incidents, rejections and complaints, and improving the 
organization’s public image (Zaramdini, 2007). On the one hand, companies and 
farms benefit from seeking certification as a means of demonstrating compliance with 
legal and industry food safety requirements. On the other hand, TPCs promote 
customer confidence and market access. The Consumer Goods Forum, GFSI, shows 
that certified companies enjoy higher margins through efficiency savings resulting 
from the application of TPC-defined regulations and that they are also able to prove 
the consistency of their respective processes internationally, which in turn promotes 
international trade.  
 The number of food recalls in the U.S. has shown a dramatic rise in the last 
few years, increasing by about 50% from 2011 to 2015. Food recalls directly cost a 
food company millions of dollars, in addition to indirect brand damage and lost sales. 
Shiptsova et al. (2002) developed an equation to calculate recall cost, shown below 
(3.1): 
 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 = 3 × 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜
× 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜       
(3.1) 
After apologizing, removing the product from store shelves and away from consumers 
as quickly as possible, and, in the process, spending a large amount of money, many 
companies are not able to survive. To continue business and earn back their 
reputation, the recalling company has to improve product quality, reduce incidents 
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and complaints, and improve the organization’s public image – which is exactly what 
TPCs offer. TPCs establish a series of requirements for managing production, 
handling, processing, and storing operations, thereby ensuring the consumer’s safety 
in each productive stage. These motives encourage recalling companies to apply for 
TPC. 
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CHAPTER 4 DATA  
 The data collected for this study dates from early 2015 to February 18, 2016. 
The complete data set includes recall variables, companies’ yearly net sales, and the 
number of recalls from 2009 to 2013 for a total of 241 observations. The data used in 
this study can be divided into three main groups.  
 The first group is composed of recall information collected from the United 
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), 
which includes data on both active and completed recalls. The FSIS provides an 
annual summary of recalls involving meat and meat products each year. Between 
January 1, 2015 to February 18, 2016, the FSIS reported 150 meat recalls, involving 
over 21.1 million pounds of product. These figures show an increase from 94 recalls 
and 18.7 million pounds of product in 2014. Among the 150 cases in 2015, 99 of them 
were classified as Class I, which involves a serious health hazard. Additionally, over 
1.7 million pounds of product were recalled, due to their potentially having been 
contaminated with extraneous materials or adulterated with a pathogen such as E. 
coli, Listeria monocytogenes or Salmonella, which, in this study, is classified as recall 
reason 2. 
 The second group includes company information containing employee 
numbers and net sales amounts for all companies. These data were collected from the 
website LexisNexis Academic. Yearly financial net sales come from WorldBase in 
U.S. dollars, from March 4, 2014. Access to company-level data allows for more 
variability, enabling a more efficient estimation for controlling for the different 
individual company sizes, which is a significant advantage of this analysis. From 
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Figure 4.1, it is easy to see that companies currently experiencing recalls and 
companies holding a certification both have higher annual net sales. 
  The third group looks at whether a subject is certified by either the BRC food 
safety certification, the Primus GFS, the FSSC22000, the Safe Quality Food (SQF) 
certification, the Global G.A.P. certification, or the ISO22000 certification. These six 
certifications are independent third-party certifications and require renewal on 
an annual basis. Since their websites only cite companies that are currently certified, 
detailed information on when a company registered their certification for the first time 
(certification history) was not available to us. Figure 4.2 shows that 44% of 
observations in this data set have neither food recall nor TPC. For those with 
certification, the proportion of having a recall and not having a recall during the study 
period are nearly the same. Only 11% of companies issued recalls are not third-party 
certified. 
 In this study, data from 241 companies are collected, including 84 companies 
with recalls and 160 companies without, from the beginning of 2015 to February 18, 
2016.  Since these companies are primarily engaged in processing, preserving, 
assembly cutting, packing, slaughtering and preparing meat and meat products from 
purchased meats, they fall under the jurisdiction of NAICS3 codes 3116114 and 
3116125 lists. There are 4578 companies under these two lists in total. As 
comparison, 160 companies without food recalls in the study period are randomly 
                                                 
3 The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS is the standard used by Federal 
statistical agencies in classifying business establishments for the purpose of collecting, analyzing, and 
publishing statistical data related to the U.S. business economy. 
4  Industry 311611 includes establishments that slaughter and processing meats (except poultry). 
5  Industry 311612 includes establishments primarily engaged in assembly cutting and packing of 
carcasses. 
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selected from NAICS codes 311611 and 311612 lists. Data were collected from all 
companies, including the company name, whether or not the company had a food 
recall within the study period, recall history from 2009 to 2014, employee numbers, 
and net sales. For companies with recall cases within the study period, recall 
information is also collected, such as recall class, reason and quantity. 
 The above data are sufficient to answer the research question in this study. We 
use a probit regression containing a single binary endogenous explanatory variable 
(one instrument is used) and one exogenous explanatory variable. The dependent 
variable in this study is whether or not the company is certified, while the independent 
variables are RECALL, BEFORE, SALES, CLASS1, and REASON2 across all three 
models. We grouped these explanatory variables together to create dummy variables, 
and set BEFORE as the instrumental variable. Table 4.1 shows the explanations of 
dummy variables and Table 4.2 presents the descriptive statistics.  
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Figure 4.1 Means of Sales by Different Groups  
(Unit: in million dollars) 
 
Source: FSIS, USDA 
Figure 4.2 Percentage of Certification Adoption with Recent Recalls  
 
Source: FSIS, USDA 
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Table 4. 1 Dummy Variables  
Variable Explanation 
CERTIFICATION Whether the firm adopt a TPC in 2016 
BEFORE (IV) Number of firm’s recall from 2009 to 
2014 
RECALL Whether has recall from January 1, 2015 
to February 18, 2016 
*takes the value of 1 when recall 
happened in this period and 0 otherwise  
CLASS1 Recall class 
*takes the value of 1 when has recall in 
Class I and 0 otherwise 
REASON2 Recall reason 
*takes the value of 1 when has recall 
reason in group 2 and 0 otherwise 
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Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics (N=241) 
 Mean S.D. 
 
Min Max 
Sales 81918191.97 734587642.00 30000.00 9316256000 
 
 
Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Recall     
0 160 66.39 160 66.39 
1 81 33.61 241 100.00 
Class1     
0 194 80.50 194 80.50 
1 47 19.50 241 100.00 
Reason2     
0 219 90.87 219 90.87 
1 22 9.13 241 100.00 
Certification      
0 205 85.06 205 85.06 
1 36 14.94 241 100.00 
Before      
0 228 94.61 228 94.61 
1 9 3.73 237 98.34 
 2 
 
3 1.24 240 99.59 
7 1 0.41 241 100.00 
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CHAPTER 5 EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY  
 Many factors influence a company’s decision to apply for TPC, including 
meeting consumer requirements, improving product quality, achieving international 
quality recognition, etc. More producers, co-manufacturers, and re-packers are 
looking to TPC programs to assist them in meeting government regulatory 
requirements. In addition, many retailers and food service providers also request that 
their suppliers become certified by TPC. Companies that currently have recall issues 
are more likely to rely on TPC to save their public image and improve their perceived 
product quality. To establish the relationship between food recall and the probability 
that a company becomes certified, probit analysis is most appropriate when estimating 
the effects of one or more independent variables on a binary dependent variable. 
5.1 Binary Probit Model  
 The probit analysis model is a type of generalized linear model that extends 
the linear regression model by linking the range of real numbers to the 0-1 range. 
When the dependent variable is binary, especially in the case of modeling 
probabilities extremely close to 0 or 1, a probit regression is used instead of Ordinary 
least squares (OLS). OLS regression is improper when the dependent variable is 
discrete (Collett, 1991; Agresti, 1990). It is very important to report robust standard 
errors because of the intrinsic heteroscedasticity of the linear probability model. A 
probit model is a rapid method for computing maximum likelihood estimates (Bliss, 
1934), and it is the basis for the final models in our paper.  
 Consider the existence of an unobserved continuous variable, Z, which can be 
understood as the “propensity towards” the event of interest. In our case, Z represents 
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a firm’s tendency to obtain certification. Mathematically, the relationship between Z 
and the probability of response is: 
 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = 𝑅𝑅 + (1 − 𝑅𝑅)𝐹𝐹(𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖) (5.1) 
where 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 is the probability the ith case experiences the event of interest; 
𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 is the value of the unobserved continuous variable for the ith case; 
𝐹𝐹 is the link function; 
c is the natural response rate. 
 In a probit model, the value of 𝛽𝛽X is taken to be the z-value of a normal 
distribution. The estimated curve is an S-shaped cumulative normal distribution, and 
the inverse standard normal distribution of the probability is modeled as a linear 
combination of the predictors. The model also assumes that Z is linearly related to the 
predictors. The functional form for the probit model can be derived from a latent 
variable model: 
 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑥𝑥1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑥𝑥2 + 𝜀𝜀   
y𝑖𝑖 = �
1       𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ > τ
0        𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ ≤ τ
 
(5.2) 
 Certification=  𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅/ 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜1/ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴2 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜 + 𝜀𝜀  
We can think of 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗as the underlying latent propensity that y=1, for the binary 
variable, certified/not certified, 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ is the propensity for certified and τ is the threshold, 
which is 0 in this study. Since latent variable 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ is unobserved, we do not know the 
distribution of the errors, ε. In order to use ML, we make an assumption that the 
distribution of the error is normally distributed.  
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5.2 Endogeneity and Instrumental Variable Problems 
 For the purpose of our study, we sought to design a model to test the impact of 
food recalls on third-party certification. We recognize that the predictive power of the 
recall dummy may be explained by unobserved factors, such as firm quality 
management, which may affect both the occurrence of a recall and certification 
adoption. Firms have a higher likelihood of producing poor quality products, which 
may cause the recall; at the same time, they may also have a higher likelihood of 
applying for TPC in order to improve management. Thus, if a binary probit model is 
used, we will have an inconsistent estimation for the estimated coefficient of recall. 
To overcome potential endogeneity issues and achieve an unbiased and consistent 
estimator ofβbased on the exogenous assumption, we propose one instrumental 
variable (IV) for the recall dummy: companies’ recall history. This IV, although 
found to be closely related to the recall dummy, should not be correlated with 
unobservable factors contributing to certification.  
 It is generally acknowledged that if regression models do not take endogeneity 
into account, significantly biased results may ensue. Since most social science 
disciplines often rely on non-experimental data, endogenous variables are a very 
common and important problem (Arendt, and Holm, 2006). Maddala (1983, p. 122) 
considers a two-equation probit model, in which the disturbances are correlated and 
the binary dependent variable of the first equation is an endogenous regressor in the 
second equation. He states that the parameters of the second equation are not 
identified if there are no exclusion restrictions on the exogenous variables. This two-
stage approach has the advantage of incorporating the predicted recall into the probit 
model as it represents the portion of recall activities related to certification adoption.  
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5.3 Probit Model with a Binary Endogenous Explanatory Variable and the 
Endogeneity Hypothesis 
 We observe the following binary choice, y1, made by a food company such as 
a meat producer, co-manufacturer, or re-packer: the company enrolls in a TPC or does 
not. We denote these two choices by y1 = 0,1, respectively. We also observe the 
binary result, y2, standing for the recall, where y2 = 1 if the company has a food recall 
in the study period, and y2 = 0 otherwise. In this study, I use a binary probit model 
that contains a single binary endogenous explanatory variable in addition to one 
instrument and two exogenous explanatory variables. The model is: 
  𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝛼𝛼1𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑧𝑧2𝑖𝑖 + 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  
𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝜋𝜋1𝑧𝑧1𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋2𝑧𝑧2𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 
y1𝑖𝑖 = �
1       𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜 𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖∗ > 0
0        𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜 𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖∗ ≤ 0
  
y2𝑖𝑖 = �
1       𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜 𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖∗ > 0
0        𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜 𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖∗ ≤ 0
 
(5.3)    
where  
yi
∗ is still an unobserved latent variable; 
𝑧𝑧1𝑖𝑖 is an instrument;  
𝑧𝑧2𝑖𝑖  is a vector of determinants of the decision to enroll;  
𝜋𝜋1is a conformal vector of unknown parameters; 
 εi is a stochastic error term that I characterize below.  
Model 2.1: Certification=  𝛼𝛼1𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜 + 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  
           𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝜋𝜋1𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅 + 𝜋𝜋2𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 
Model 2.2: Certification=  𝛼𝛼1𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜1 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜 + 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 
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           𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜1 = 𝜋𝜋1𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅 + 𝜋𝜋2𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 
Model 2.3: Certification =  𝛼𝛼1𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴2 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜 + 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 
          𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴2 = 𝜋𝜋1𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅 + 𝜋𝜋2𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 
 In equation 5.3, (𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖) is independent and distributed as bivariate normal with 
mean zero; each has unit variance, and ρ = Cov(𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖). ρ (shown as Rho in result 
tables) is the correlation parameter, which can be understood as the correlation 
between the unobservable explanatory variables of the two equations. If ρ ≠ 0, then 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 
and 𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖∗  are correlated, and probit estimation of equation (5.3) is inconsistent for 
𝛼𝛼1and 𝛽𝛽1and is therefore endogenous. On the contrary, if ρ=0, 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 and 𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖∗  are 
uncorrelated, this leads us to definite the hypothesis system as follows: 
 𝐻𝐻0: ρ = 0  
𝐻𝐻1: ρ ≠  0 
(5.4)    
 The effect of 𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖  is often of primary interest, especially when 𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖  indicates 
participation in some sort of program, which in this paper is the adoption of 
certification. The first equation is a selection that uses the probit model and creates 
the predicted probability of adoption certification of each subject in the sample. The 
second statement is also a probit model to the predicted probability of 
recall/class1/reason2. The purpose of this model is to estimate the probability that an 
observation with food recall will adopt a third-party certification. The probit model 
analyzes whether the sample company chose to certify. It transforms the sigmoid 
dose-response curve to a straight line that can then be analyzed by regression, either 
through least squares or maximum likelihood. For this study, we use the “qlim” 
routine in SAS (SAS 9_4, 2016). 
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  We test the null hypothesis that all coefficients except that of the intercept are 
statistically equal to zero. And we test three models in the same way, trying to 
identify which recall element has the most significant impact on certification 
adoption. In all three models, the dependent variable is whether the sample company 
certified or not. The independent variables in the first probit model are RECALL, 
BEFORE, and SALES. RECALL is the binary endogenous explanatory variable and 
we use CLASS1and REASON2 instead of RECALL in second and third models, 
respectively.  
5.4 Maximum Likelihood Estimation and Log Likelihood Function 
 The maximum likelihood method is used to estimate the parameters due to the 
nonlinearity of the Probit model in 𝛽𝛽. When using the maximum likelihood estimation 
method to estimate the parameter of the distribution model, the likelihood value can 
be used to assess the fit of the distribution to the data set. The likelihood function is 
the basis of the maximum likelihood estimation parameter estimation method. 
Assume we have an independent random sample (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖, 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖), where i=1, 2, 3…, n from 
the Bernoulli distribution with probability P(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ,𝛽𝛽). The probability density function 
of a Bernoulli random variable, x, is given by f (x)=𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥(1-p) 1-x, where x=0, 1 and p is 
the probability of success. Collecting all n observations and assuming independence, 
which gives the likelihood function, is:         
 
𝐿𝐿(𝛽𝛽|𝑦𝑦, 𝑥𝑥) = ∏ Pr(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖|𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝛽𝛽)𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 ,                                   
=∏ Pr(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 0|𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ,𝛽𝛽)1−𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 Pr(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ,𝛽𝛽)𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 , 
=∏ [1 − P(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ,𝛽𝛽)]1−𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 [P(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝛽𝛽)]𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 . 
(5.5) 
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The natural logarithm of the likelihood function is log-likelihood, which is more 
convenient to work with. The log of L= 𝐿𝐿(𝛽𝛽|𝑦𝑦, 𝑥𝑥) yields: 
 𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿) = ∑ {𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 ln𝑃𝑃 (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝛽𝛽) + (1 − 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) ln [1 − P(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝛽𝛽)]}𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 . (5.6) 
It is then easy to show that the log-likelihoods for the probit model are as follows: 
 
𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿) = �{𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 ln𝐹𝐹 (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝛽𝛽) + (1 − 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) ln𝐹𝐹 (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝛽𝛽)]}
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
 (5.7) 
The maximum likelihood parameter is found by taking the derivative of the log-
likelihood equation (5.8), setting it to zero and then solving for the unknown 
parameters; extending to the probit model, we find: 
 𝐿𝐿(𝛽𝛽) = ∑ [𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖
+ (1 − 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖)
−𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
1−𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖
]𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖. 
   𝐿𝐿(𝛽𝛽) = ∑
𝑦𝑦
𝑖𝑖−𝜙𝜙�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇𝛽𝛽�
𝜙𝜙�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇𝛽𝛽� ×[1−𝜙𝜙�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇𝛽𝛽�]
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1 𝜑𝜑(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝛽𝛽)𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖.        
(5.8) 
5.5 Marginal Effects  
 In the interpretation of a probit model, presenting marginal effects often brings 
more information than just looking at coefficients. Since the variance of the 
underlying latent variable (y*) is not identified and can differ across models, 
comparing coefficients across models can be very misleading. The marginal effect of 
a predictor is defined as the partial derivative of the event probability with respect to 
the predictor and it measures the expected change in the response variable as a 
function of the change in that predictor while other explanatory variables are held 
constant.  
 The marginal effect is the slope of the line drawn along the tangent to the 
fitted probability curve 𝜙𝜙(𝑦𝑦 = 1|𝑋𝑋 = 𝑥𝑥) at the selected point holding all other 
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variables constant. The binary probit main-effects model is 𝜙𝜙−1(𝑝𝑝) = ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖, where 
𝜙𝜙−1 is the inverse of the cumulative normal distribution function. The marginal effect 
of 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 in the probit model is equal to φ(𝑥𝑥′𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖, where φ(𝑥𝑥′𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽)is the density function 
of the standard normal distribution evaluated at 𝑥𝑥′𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽, 𝑥𝑥′𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽 is the product of the row 
vector of chosen covariate values, 𝑥𝑥′𝑖𝑖, and the column vector of parameter 
estimates, 𝛽𝛽, and 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 is the parameter estimate for 𝑥𝑥′𝑖𝑖  .   
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CHAPTER 6: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION   
 In this section, in order to investigate the role of food recall and net sales 
factors that influence the adoption of third-party certification, we report the maximum 
likelihood estimates from probit models without IV (Tables 6.1) to compare them 
with probit models with IV (Table 6.2.1, 6.2.2 and 6.2.3). The log likelihood of each 
model is also provided in that model’s table. Marginal effects and predicted 
probabilities are shown in Table 6.3.  
6.1 Binary Probit Model without Using an Instrument 
 In this section, we estimate the probability of a firm having a TPC by using a 
probit model without an instrumental variable. 
 Across these three models, a firm’s annual net sales are significant to its 
decision of whether or not to obtain certification. However, the impacts of recall 
variables differ. Our results show that if the firm had a food recall, then there was a 
significant impact on the company’s decision about certification adoption; if the recall 
was Class I, it is not significant at all; and if the recall happened for Reason 2, it has a 
significant influence on a company’s decision at a 5% significance level.  
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Table 6.1 Binary Probit Model (N=241)  
Dependent Variable: Certification 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable 
Recall 
(𝛽𝛽1) 
Sales 
(𝛽𝛽2) 
Class1 
(𝛽𝛽1) 
Sales 
(𝛽𝛽2) 
Reason2 
(𝛽𝛽1) 
Sales
(𝛽𝛽2) 
Coef 
0.612 
*** 
0.006 
*** 
0.183 
0.007 
*** 
0.766 
** 
0.006 
*** 
S.E. 0.219 0.002 0.254 0.002 0.318 0.002 
Log 
likelihood 
-85.65 -89.30 -86.76 
McFadde
n LRI 
(R2) 
0.16 0.12 0.15 
Note: Asterisks ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively.   
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6.2 Probit Model with a Binary Endogenous Explanatory Variable 
 The results presented in Table 6.2.1, 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 are drawn from three 
probit models with the same IV, and have different binary endogenous explanatory 
variables, which are RECALL, CLASS1 and REASON2, respectively. Table 6.2.1 
includes sales and whether the firm had a recall or not within the study period to 
predict the influence of each variable on the firm’s TPC adoption decision. Model 2 
includes recall sales and Class I, while Model 3 uses sales and recall reason group 2 
instead.  
  First of all, recall variables RECALL, CLASS1, and REASON2 are 
statistically significant. All have a marked impact on firms’ third-party certification 
adoption. Results from three models indicate that firms recently having recall cases 
and being recalled in Class I and/or Reason 2 are more likely to apply for 
certification. In Model 1, firms’ net yearly sales are somewhat insignificant to 
certification adoption, while in Model 2 and 3 they are significant at the 5% 
significance level, which suggests that net sales have a positive effect on certification 
adoption. Companies with large net sales tend to certify more than do low-net-sale 
companies.  
 Regarding the recall equation, a company’s recall history from 2009 to 2014, 
variable BEFORE, has notable influence on whether the company has recalled in the 
study period at the 5% significance level in Model 1, indicating that companies with a 
recall history are more likely to continue having recalls in the current period. 
Company recall history is also significant at the 5% significance level to recall Class I 
in Model 2 and at the 1% significance level to recall Reason 2 in Model 3. This means 
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that current year and past Class I recalls are correlated, as is the case with Reason 2 
recalls. 
 Yearly net sales have a different impact on endogenous explanatory variables 
in these three models. Sales have a significant influence on whether or not the 
company has recalled in the study period at the 1% significance level, and also have 
an influence on whether the recall happened for Reason 2 at the 10% significance 
level. It is not, however, significant to recall class, which means the annual net sales 
have varied impact on a firm’s recall variables. 
 Output includes the following table of parameter estimates. The endogenous 
dummy coefficient (certification. recall/ certification. class1 and certification. 
reason2) and the correlation coefficient (Rho) in each model have a central role in the 
inference. The parameter estimates for these endogenous explanatory variables 
indicate a strong effect of the recall variables on certification adoption (p <. 0001). 
Rho parameter estimates, at the end of each results table, is the correlation of the error 
terms from the two equations. The default value of Rho, 0, means the responses are 
uncorrelated, hereby making 𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖∗  a standard probit model. Rho parameters in these 
three models are obtained as -0.781, -0.810, and -0.779 respectively, and all are 
significant at the 1% significance level, indicating that certification adoption is 
correlated with recall variables and that Equation 5.3 cannot be replaced by a standard 
probit model. This justifies the use of the instrument method.  
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Table 6.2.1 Probit Estimates of Recall on Certification Adoption 
Dependent Variable: Certification 
Variable Coef S.E. 
Certification_recall (𝛼𝛼1) 1.851*** 0.469 
Certification_sales (𝛽𝛽1) 0.002 0.002 
Recall_before (𝜋𝜋1) 0.601** 0.252 
Recall_sales (𝜋𝜋2) 0.010*** 0.003 
Rho -0.781*** 0.249 
Number of observations: 241      
Endogenous Variable: Recall 
Log likelihood value: -203.25 
Note: Asterisks ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively.   
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Table 6.2.2 Probit Estimates of Recall Class I on Certification Adoption 
Dependent Variable: Certification 
Variable Coef S.E. 
Certification_class1 (𝛼𝛼1) 1.700 *** 0.550 
Certification_sales (𝛽𝛽1) 0.005 ** 0.002 
Class1_before (𝜋𝜋1) 0.550 ** 0.237 
Class1_sales (𝜋𝜋2) 0.0001 0.0001 
Rho -0.810 *** 0.216 
Number of observations: 241 
Endogenous Variable: Class1 
Log likelihood value: -224.01 
Note: Asterisks ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively.   
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Table 6.2.3 Probit Estimates of Recall Reason 2 on Certification Adoption 
Dependent Variable: Certification 
Variable Coef S.E. 
Certification_reason2 (𝛼𝛼1) 2.317*** 0.648 
Certification_sales (𝛽𝛽1) 0.005** 0.002 
Reason2_before (𝜋𝜋1) 0.369*** 0.124 
Reason2_sales (𝜋𝜋2) 0.0002* 0.0001 
Rho -0.779*** 0.281 
Number of observations: 241 
Endogenous Variable: Reseason2 
Log likelihood value: -156.09 
Note: Asterisks ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively.   
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6.3 Marginal Effects 
 From Table 6.3 below, we observe that once a recall occurs, a firm's 
probability to seek certification will increase by 36.37%. If the recall was a Class I 
recall, the firm's probability of becoming certified will go up by 34.32%. The 
situation that most increases a company’s likelihood of applying for certification, at 
40.30%, is when the firm has a food recall for Reason 2. 
 If a company has a recall history from 2009 to 2014, no matter the number of 
recalls, its probability of having a recall during the study period increases by 19.86%. 
The probability of this company having a recent Class I or Reason 2 recall increases 
by 14.69% and 5.7% respectively. These results indicate that once a food company 
has a recall record, the probability of this company having food recalls again 
increases. 
 In the above three models, if the average yearly net sales of a firm increases 
by one unit (one million dollars, in this study), the probability of the firm becoming 
certified increases by less than 0.1%. We observe that a limited improvement in 
annual net sales entails an unremarkable impact on certification adoption. Moreover, 
an increase in average yearly net sales does not increase a company’s likelihood of 
having a food recall. 
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Table 6.3 Marginal Effects of Recall Elements on Certification Adoption 
Variable Estimated Marginal 
Effects 
Predicted probabilities 
Model 1 (Endogenous Variable: Recall) 
Certification_recall(𝛼𝛼1) 0.3637 Certification: 0.2462 
Recall: 0.3364 Certification_sales(𝛽𝛽1) 0.0004 
Recall_before(𝜋𝜋1) 0.1986 
Recall_sales(𝜋𝜋2) 0.0032 
Model 2 (Endogenous Variable: Class1) 
Certification_class1(𝛼𝛼1) 0.3432 Certification: 0.2179 
Class1: 0.1963 Certification_sales(𝛽𝛽1) 0.0010 
Class1_before(𝜋𝜋1) 0.1469 
Class1_sales(𝜋𝜋2) 0.00003 
Model 3 (Endogenous Variable: Reason2) 
Certification_reason2(𝛼𝛼1) 0.4030 Certification: 0.1782 
Class1: 0.0925 Certification_sales(𝛽𝛽1) 0.0009 
Reason2_before(𝜋𝜋1) 0.057 
Reason2_sales(𝜋𝜋2) 0.00003 
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS  
7.1 Concluding Discussion 
 In this paper, we propose a binary probit model to analyze the relationship 
between current recalls and certification adoption, while also controlling for the 
endogeneity of the recall variable. This econometric framework enables us to control 
the self-selection bias and other forms of unobserved endogeneity problems. Using 
firm level of annual net sales and recall information, we obtain marginal effects 
allowing us to explore how a firm’s probability of becoming certified changes with 
different recall variables. We found that if a company in the U.S. meat product 
industry had a food recall between January 1, 2015 and February 18, 2016, there was 
a significant positive effect on the company’s decision regarding third-party 
certification adoption. Similar results hold for companies that issued Class I and 
Reason 2 recalls. Both of these variables may cause health hazard situations, which 
can then cause health problems, death or large-scale food safety problems. Once a 
recall occurs, a firm’s probability of becoming certified increases by 36.37%. As for 
Class I and Reason 2 recalls happening, the firm's probability of becoming certified 
increases by 34.32% and 40%, respectively.  
 Furthermore, a company with larger yearly net sales has a stronger preference 
for applying TPC than low-net-sale companies. However, the improvement of firms’ 
net sales does not generate an equivalent increase in certification adoption, as was 
initially expected. If a firm’s average yearly net sales increase by one million dollars, 
the probability of the firm becoming certified only increases about 0.1%. Moreover, 
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companies with a previous food recall record are more likely to have recent recall 
issues.  
 These results highly suggest that firms with recent recall cases, especially 
recalls caused by the threat of foodborne illnesses, tend to be more likely to apply for 
certification. Successful third-party certifications monitor and enforce standards and 
prevent firms from producing poor quality and/or unsafe products, which may lead to 
foodborne pathogens. Certification would likely help firms regain lost market shares 
and rebuild consumer confidence in product safety. Moreover, firms with TPC have a 
competitive advantage and better access to global agro-food systems. Thus, 
certification might be one of the best options for recovery after food recall incidents.  
7.2 Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research  
 This empirical study is limited in that the data do not provide details on 
registration time or adoption with specific certification bodies and auditors. This 
study is also constrained by limited company information. These limitations could be 
addressed in further research through the use of case studies and increased sample 
sizes to supplement the statistical company data. A better perspective could then be 
gained on how food recalls affect TPC adoption, as well as how this might affect food 
recalls by controlling for other motives that influencing companies’ decisions. And 
with companies’ TPC adoption records, in further study we can also discus how TPC 
adoption influences recall occurrence. These topics are both important and can shed 
light on the strategic relevance and economic value of TPC to companies with recalls 
and the impact of TPC on subsequent recalls. 
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APPENDIX  
Appendix:  SAS Codes 
Descriptive Statistics 
data qlim2; set qlim;  
if num=0 then recall=0; else recall=1; 
if class=1 then class1=1; else class1=0; 
if reason=2 then reason2=1; else reason2=0; 
sales2=sales/1000000; 
run; 
/*mean*/ 
proc means data =qlim2; 
var employees sales weight; 
run; 
/*frequency*/ 
proc freq data = qlim2; 
table num recall before class1 reason2 certificate; 
run; 
 
Binary Probit Model 
/*Model 6.1.1*/ 
proc qlim data=qlim2;        
model certificate=recall Sales2/ discrete;  
run; 
/*Model 6.1.2*/ 
proc qlim data=qlim2;        
model certificate=class1 Sales2/ discrete;  
run; 
/*Model 6.1.3*/ 
proc qlim data=qlim2;        
model certificate=reason2 Sales2/ discrete;  
run; 
 
Binary Probit Model with IV and Marginal Effect 
/*Model 6.2.1*/ 
proc qlim data=qlim2;        
model certificate=recall Sales2/ discrete;  
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model recall=before sales2/ discrete;   
output out=outqlim1 marginal proball; 
run; 
proc means data=outqlim1 n mean; 
var Meff_P2_certificate_recall Meff_P2_certificate_sales2 Meff_P2_recall_before 
Meff_P2_recall_sales2 Prob2_certificate Prob2_recall; 
title 'Average of the Individual Marginal Effects 1'; 
run; 
/*Model 6.2.2*/ 
proc qlim data=qlim2;        
model certificate=class1 Sales/ discrete;  
model class1=before sales/ discrete;       
output out=outqlim2 marginal proball; 
run; 
proc means data=outqlim2 n mean; 
var Meff_P2_certificate_class1 Meff_P2_certificate_sales2  
Meff_P2_class1_before Meff_P2_class1_sales2 
Prob2_certificate Prob2_class1; 
title 'Average of the Individual Marginal Effects 2'; 
run; 
/*Model 6.2.3*/ 
proc qlim data=qlim2;        
model certificate=reason2 Sales/ discrete;  
model reason2=before sales/ discrete;       
output out=outqlim3 marginal proball; 
run; 
proc means data=outqlim3 n mean; 
var Meff_P2_certificate_reason2 Meff_P2_certificate_sales2  
Meff_P2_reason2_before Meff_P2_reason2_sales2 
Prob2_certificate Prob2_reason2; 
title 'Average of the Individual Marginal Effects 3'; 
run; 
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